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Libraries and Publisher Price Control
T H E  N E T  P R I C E  S Y S T E M  (1901–1914) 
A N D   C O N T E M P O R A R Y  E-B O O K  P R I C I N G
Mei Zhang and Jonathan Senchyne 
University of Wisconsin–Madison
ABSTRACT: This article explores how librarians have responded to publishers’ control 
over book prices in two different, yet related, historical periods. It historicizes the net price 
system, a book-price control system in the early twentieth century, within debates by librar-
ians about library book buying and price negotiation practices. Turning to similarities in 
current e-book pricing, the article focuses on how publishers reduce the “fragility” of books 
as cultural commodities in either paper or electronic format, and then explores how librar-
ies, publishers, and distributors gain power in library book pricing.
KEYWORDS: Library book market, net price system, e-book, price control, cultural 
commodities 
Publishers, vendors, and libraries have long debated book pricing. In recent 
years, the introduction of e-book circulation in both public and academic 
libraries has changed the concept of what constitutes a fair book price. 
Publishers have developed a variety of e-book pricing models for libraries, 
such as the twenty-six-loan cap from HarperCollins and steep price increases 
by Random House, and these new models created uproar in library–publisher 
relations. While libraries have long paid more for print books, higher prices 
once came with ownership and unlimited circulation rights. In contrast, con-
temporary publishers often introduce licenses and limits on circulation, along 
with high prices, to library e-books. In trade periodicals such as Library Journal 
(LJ) and Publishers Weekly (PW), librarians and publishers alike describe their 
frustrations with these new book-pricing models and circulation restrictions. 
Today, librarians fear that the new models limit e-book services and strain 
budgets. In turn, publishers explain that the changes to established pricing 
models are important to protect their retail sales of e-books.1
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This is not the first time that publishers have established special pricing 
models for library orders to protect sales. In fact, the historical study of nego-
tiations over book pricing has much to tell us about present  circumstances. In 
the early twentieth century, publishers established a pricing model known as 
the “net price system” in order to raise book prices, including prices paid spe-
cifically by public libraries. In this essay, we describe the impact of the net price 
system on library book buying practices and librarians conceptualizations of 
good prices for books, and situate these changes relative to the concerns of 
the booksellers and publishers they dealt with.2 In addition to this history of 
net pricing, we draw on the theories about what differentiates the market for 
“cultural commodities” from other types of commodity. This historical study 
reveals over a century’s worth of conflict and negotiation between publishers’ 
bottom lines, library budgets and circulation needs, and the unique nature of 
cultural materials in the marketplace. Librarians, publishers, and scholars of 
digital culture seeking to understand the contemporary e-book market should 
place the present within this relevant historical context.
Ours is also an argument for the necessity of the history of books and pub-
lishing, library history, and cultural studies for understanding book markets 
and negotiations of power in the past as well as the present. Book histori-
ans have long studied the relations between agents such as bookmakers, buy-
ers, and sellers in what Robert Darnton famously called the “communication 
 circuit.”3 We pursue a granular set of relations between publishers, distributors, 
and libraries in the early twentieth century to construct a model that owes as 
much to library history as it does book history. Doing so opens space to ana-
lyze strategies publishers have employed to protect and enhance the market 
value of their products and maximize sales to public libraries in both the early 
twentieth-century net price system and the contemporary e-pricing landscape.
As Wayne Wiegand wrote over a decade ago, interdisciplinary scholarship 
at the intersections of library history, book history, and cultural studies creates 
necessary space for scholars to think about the ordinary life of libraries, infor-
mation, and users within communities. If, as Wiegand hoped, such scholar-
ship can “help the American library community better understand its present, 
so that it can more prudently plan its future,” then we suggest a historical 
analysis of the interests and power holders involved in book buying, price fix-
ing, and negotiation as a concrete way of understanding long-established con-
flicts, whether books and information are on paper or in electronic formats.4 
Toward this goal, we present the history of the net price system focusing on 
how libraries engaged and negotiated prices and purchasing power within it. 
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Then, focusing on the similar nature of both print books and e-books as cul-
tural commodities in the marketplace, we situate contemporary e-book pric-
ing and vending to libraries within the same structure of power dynamics we 
saw emerging in the net price era. We argue that power dynamics between 
libraries, distributors, and publishers in the market of cultural commodi-
ties are very similar across these historical periods. Therefore, understanding 
e-book pricing within this long century of price control effort is important for 
the practice of librarianship today.
The Book Trades, Libraries, and the Net Price System
In the United States reading grew “tremendously” after the Civil War, accom-
panied by a major expansion in the scale and speed of publication. Many 
large publishing firms grew into large-scale operations from family businesses 
and consolidated in major cities. “The increasing speed of communication 
and transportation,” writes historian John Tebbel, “brought the big publishers 
directly into contact with the national market, and manufacturing facilities 
were concentrated more and more in the major centers to serve them.”5 But 
books were not the only commodities experiencing rapid transformation in 
the scale of production and the size and location of marketplaces. Publishers, 
therefore, had to contend with changes in marketing and retailing going on in 
bookstores and general stores alike.
In the late nineteenth century, the number of bookstores in the United States 
decreased significantly, largely due to competition from other types of book 
distribution, like dry goods stores, department stores, and mail-order agencies. 
These merchants purchased their books, mainly popular fictions, from ware-
houses, and then sold books to customers at low prices or even below cost.6 
Booksellers also encountered competition when publishers sold their books 
directly to retail customers at reduced prices. Bookseller profits were further 
depressed by the fact that people could enjoy reading multiple popular books 
from circulating libraries with only a small subscription fee, rather than pur-
chasing books from booksellers. All this competition pushed booksellers to give 
larger discounts to customers, which then led to shrinking profits. Consequently, 
many bookstores went out of business; for those that still sold books, many of 
them could not afford to carry as much stock as they did previously.7
Along with booksellers, publishers also suffered from competition among 
different book distributors. Since many of the dry goods stores or department 
stores selling books only carried popular fiction, publishers relied heavily on 
This content downloaded from 146.96.25.47 on Wed, 06 Dec 2017 16:46:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
174 L I B R A R I E S :  C U LT U R E ,  H I S TO R Y,  A N D  S O C I E T Y
booksellers to sell a wider range of their books. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, a reduction in the number of bookstores and their stocks led directly 
to the reduced sale of books. Publishers often did not recoup the expense of 
printing them.8 As a result, publishers and booksellers joined forces to reform 
the book trade, and the major measures they adopted were the formation 
of two trade organizations—the American Publishers’ Association and the 
American Booksellers’ Association—and the net price system established and 
maintained by both associations.
In 1900 major publishers in the United States, including Harper and 
Brothers, Houghton Mifflin, and Macmillan, under the leadership of Charles 
Scribner, the president of Charles Scribner’s Sons, formed a centralized 
trade organization called the American Publishers’ Association (APA), which 
expanded to include “practically all of the general publishers” by 1901.9 The 
original purpose of the APA, upon its formation in 1900, was to “remedy . . . 
certain trade abuses which have told with peculiar hardship upon the retail 
dealers in books” and it aimed to achieve this goal through “reasonable reg-
ulation of prices . . . on certain classes of books.” Following suit, booksellers 
formed the American Booksellers’ Association (ABA) in 1901 to cooperate with 
publishers on the regulation of prices.10
To address the problems of the book trade, in 1901 the associations put 
a joint effort into establishing a net price system largely based on the net 
book agreement adopted by booksellers and publishers abroad, specifically 
in the United Kingdom.11 Sir Frederick Macmillan pioneered the United 
Kingdom’s net price system with the publication of Alfred Marshall’s Principles 
of Economics in 1890. Macmillan argued that net pricing was necessary because 
what we would today call “sticker” prices were being set artificially high in 
order to create the appearance of deep discounting and because with discount-
ing the profit margin on retail books was so low that little attention was given 
to them by sellers.12 In the United States, George Haven Putnam would give 
nearly identical reasons for the APA’s development of a net price system: pub-
lishers, he argued, needed to set a fixed price in order to maintain the finan-
cial ecology supporting the publication of books. “The publishers knew,” he 
recounted, “that it was essential for the interests of the producers of books,” 
including authors and publishers, “that an adequate machinery should be 
maintained for bringing books to the attention of American readers,” because 
“the public at large had a very direct literary and educational interest in any 
measures that might further the economic distribution of books.”13 The legal-
ity of protecting these interests was another question, as the Sherman Antitrust 
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Act was passed in 1890, the same year as the establishment of the UK net price 
system, and would eventually bring down American publishing’s attempts to 
protect its market and infrastructure.14 But before the net price system was 
found to be illegal, librarians debated it and strategized how to push back 
against its strictures and demands on their book-buying budgets.
The move in 1901 was the first time in the history of the US book trade 
that publishers and booksellers worked together to regulate the price of books. 
The net price system included the following regulations: (1) all copyrighted 
books first published after May 1, 1901, would be categorized as “net books,” 
except for school books and fiction; (2) publishers would set the prices for net 
books within the first year after publication; (3) publishers would aim to set 
net prices lower than the prices prior to the new system; and (4) publishers 
should only provide their books (including non–net books) to booksellers that 
maintained net prices, with the exception of libraries, which would be granted 
a discount of no more than 10 percent. The net price system also suggested a 
general 25 percent discount for booksellers.15
The APA amended the net price system several times between its creation in 
1901 and its abolishment in 1914. In 1902 the system added protection for fic-
tion by limiting the library discount to 33 1/3 percent. In 1904 the APA revised 
the system to eliminate the restrictions on the sale of noncopyrighted books. 
Then, in 1907, the APA changed its regulations into recommendations, and 
thus publishers were “free to disregard if they choose.”16 In the spring of 1909, 
the “net fiction” campaign began, where several publishers published their 
fiction books as net books, which meant their library discount shifted from 
33 1/3 percent to 10 percent. In the fall of 1910, 47 percent of fiction books 
were listed as net.17 In 1913 the Supreme Court decided in the Macy’s case 
that the net price system was an infringement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. 
Consequently, the APA dissolved the net price system in 1914.18
Libraries and the Net Price System
When the net price system took effect in May 1901, it immediately raised 
concern among librarians. The most important question they asked was how 
the new arrangement would change book prices for libraries. Prior to the net 
price system, libraries often received a discount from the list price similar to 
the one publishers gave to booksellers. The net price system, however, limited 
the library discount for net books to 10 percent of the uniform net price set 
by publishers. In addition to the reduced discount, the APA also suggested 
This content downloaded from 146.96.25.47 on Wed, 06 Dec 2017 16:46:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
176 L I B R A R I E S :  C U LT U R E ,  H I S TO R Y,  A N D  S O C I E T Y
the net price be lower than the previous list price, and thus   publishers 
claimed that the actual price for library books should be “somewhat near to 
 present library rates,” but that they would “not in all cases make a price as 
low as the present price on the same lines of books.” A trade insider estimated 
that the actual price for libraries might increase 5–10 percent under the new 
plan. Several librarians expected an 8 percent increase on average library book 
prices.19
Librarians initially showed support for the net price system when the APA 
introduced it as a way to restore the book trade by protecting the interests of 
booksellers. A librarian stated that the goal of libraries was the same as that 
of publishers and booksellers, namely, to “plac[e] . . . good literature in the 
hands of all the people.” It was, some argued, “for the interest of the libraries 
that the booksellers be not driven out of business.”20 More important, due 
to lobbying from publishers and booksellers, some librarians expected only 
a small increase in the actual cost of books, which they could “accept[] with 
reasonable grace . . . as a proper advance in the interest of the bookseller.”21
Librarians’ optimism toward the net price system did not last long; shortly 
after the new system went into effect, librarians became wary of it. Some 
librarians noticed that the net prices were not as low as they expected and 
sometimes were even higher than the old list prices; with the library dis-
count limited to 10 percent, libraries’ book prices increased far more than the 
expected 8 percent. At this point, librarians did not adopt any aggressive mea-
sure to oppose the net price system; rather, they tended to take a wait-and-see 
approach toward the new arrangement, since it was still “in an experimental 
stage.” Some librarians closely observed the changes of book prices, and an 
editorial in the LJ  called upon librarians to “be on the alert to see that these 
[the net prices] are really on the reduced basis.”22 At the same time, others 
warned that “some careful consideration of these varied interests at an early 
date would save considerable wrangling in the future,” and encouraged pub-
lishers to reconsider their pricing strategies.23
Beginning in the second year of the net price system, as evidence grew 
that the actual prices of library books had indeed increased more than the 
expected 8 percent, some librarians demonstrated their dissatisfaction. They 
questioned the real goal behind the new system.24 One librarian stated that 
“this advance seemed to the librarians to be designed not so much for the 
benefit of the bookseller as for the benefit of the book publisher.” Also, some 
librarians felt that publishers used the net price system to discriminate against 
them, claiming it was unfair for publishers to “bolster up the business of the 
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retail bookseller by imposing a tax on the public library which can so ill afford 
to bear it.”25
Some librarians called for changes to the new system; as one librarian put 
it, “we should support, not the net-price system, but a net-price system.”26 
The two major modifications librarians requested were to lower the net prices 
or to increase the library discount. These requests were first proposed by the 
Massachusetts Library Club in a letter to the APA in January 1902. The library 
committee requested that the APA consider some modifications of the net 
price system “either by changing the discount allowed to libraries or by read-
justing the scale of prices.”27 Later in March, at the Bi-State Library Meeting 
in the Atlantic City, the Pennsylvania Library Club and the New Jersey Library 
Association passed a resolution requesting that the APA “consent that dealers 
and publishers be permitted to give to libraries a discount up to 25 percent 
on net books.” Further, some state library associations endorsed this resolu-
tion. During the American Library Association (ALA) annual conference held 
in Magnolia, Massachusetts, in July, the ALA approved a similar resolution 
requesting the APA increase the discount for library books.28
In order to justify their requests for modifying the net price system, some 
librarians argued that libraries were often large purchasers with a good reputa-
tion in the book trade, and publishers and booksellers should grant larger dis-
counts if they wanted to keep doing business with libraries.29 Another major 
reason mentioned by several librarians was that libraries were educational 
institutions supported by public funds. Specifically, as custodians of public 
funds, libraries tried to attract more readers, which required them to provide 
as many books as possible to meet readers’ demands. However, the increased 
book prices reduced libraries’ purchasing power significantly, which then 
forced libraries to buy fewer books than before. The lack of sufficient books to 
provide to their readers limited libraries’ educational function considerably.30
The APA, as the organization that established the net price system, denied 
library requests to lower net prices or increase library discounts. Both the LJ 
and PW  published responses from the APA responding to the libraries’ requests, 
many of which were from the correspondence between Charles Scribner, pres-
ident of the APA, and W. T. Peoples, chairman of the ALA Committee on the 
Relations of Libraries with the Booktrade.
In explaining the reasons for refusing to lower net prices, the APA claimed 
that it was individual publishers, rather than the APA, who fixed the net prices. 
As Scribner stated, “What we are trying to do is to maintain the retail price for 
a year”; the secretary of the APA, George P. Brett, also stated that the APA “does 
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not, and cannot, attempt to dictate to its members in regard to the prices at 
which they issue their books.” Therefore, the APA suggested to librarians that 
“any complaint should be addressed directly to [publishers].”31
Further, the APA stated that it had recommended lowering the net prices 
from the previous list prices. Based on “a careful review of new net prices,” the 
APA believed that “the average price obtained by us is less than under the old 
system,” and only a small number of book prices were too high. When com-
menting on net books with extremely high prices, the APA argued that “the 
prices of books are subject to the ordinary business laws of competition and 
supply and demand” and thus these expensive net books should, theoretically, 
suffer through limited sales.32
Despite complaints from librarians and suggestions from the APA and the 
trade, many publishers did not take any steps to reduce their net prices. The 
major reason for them to maintain current net prices was the increasing cost 
of publishing. An editorial from PW  explained the increase in cost in different 
elements of book publishing, including an upward trend in remuneration to 
authors and an increase in manufacturing and distribution costs; therefore, 
publishers had to raise the net prices to cover these increased costs. It is also 
interesting to note that PW  published several editorials to reaffirm that the 
purpose of the net price system was not to increase publishers’ rates or retail 
prices. Even if they were ineffective, these editorials warned the publishers 
who priced their net books unduly high to reconsider their net prices.33
Predictably, booksellers opposed the libraries’ request for a larger discount, 
and their association, the ABA, also denied this request. Further, the ABA pro-
posed a more radical and aggressive net price system; it urged the APA to 
remove the library discount, to put all fiction on the net price system, and to 
extend the protection of net books to at least two years.34
First and foremost, booksellers claimed that they could not afford a larger 
library discount. They argued that, even with the current 10 percent discount, 
they could barely make a profit in their library orders, and an increased library 
discount would bring a loss to their business. Booksellers claimed it was “mor-
ally wrong to sell goods without profit.” As a result, booksellers opposed grant-
ing libraries a larger discount; moreover, some aggressive booksellers and the 
ABA petitioned the APA to remove the current library discount for net books 
so that the booksellers would obtain an extra amount of revenue to cover the 
loss generated by carrying books for libraries.35
In addition to arguing that they could not afford a larger library discount, 
booksellers argued that libraries’ role as custodians of public funding did not 
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justify their request for a larger discount. Booksellers contended that libraries 
were tax-supported institutions, and local booksellers had already paid through 
taxes to support libraries. If libraries wanted to meet their patrons’ increasing 
demands, argued the booksellers, then they should seek more funding, such 
as asking for more tax money, rather than sacrifice the local booksellers’ profit 
through a larger discount. As the ABA put it, “there is no possible reason 
why local dealers, authors and publishers should bear the whole burden!” One 
bookseller pointed out that libraries did not ask other business partners, like 
architects and contractors of the library buildings, or other supply houses to 
sacrifice their profits; based on the same rule, libraries should also allow book-
sellers to obtain “a reasonable profit for the expenditure of public funds.”36
Third, booksellers argued that the removal of the library discount would 
also be beneficial to other parties in the book trade. With the additional money 
gained from library orders of net books, booksellers would be able to order 
more new books, which meant increasing the exposure for these new books. 
As a result, booksellers could sell more books, and publishers and authors 
would then enjoy the “mutual advantage.”37
Finally, booksellers cited the net price systems in Britain and Germany, 
which were the models for the new American net price system, to support 
their attempt to remove the library discount.38 Since the English net price 
system required libraries to pay the full net price, and the German system 
reduced its library discount from the original 10 percent to 5 percent, and 
eventually removed it entirely, booksellers claimed that the American net price 
system should follow the examples in Britain and Germany and reduce or 
even eliminate the library discount.39
Unable to satisfy either libraries or booksellers, the APA decided to deny the 
requests from both sides, and maintain the 10 percent library discount.40 When 
libraries’ attempts to lower net prices and gain larger discounts failed, they began 
to modify their book selection methods in order to relieve financial hardships 
caused by increased book prices. As a librarian stated, “We feel that immediate 
relief from the hardships of the net price system must come from what the 
librarian may do toward adjusting himself beneath the burden, not by ineffec-
tual struggles to throw it off, nor yet by attacks upon those who imposed it.”41 
Important actions librarians took included the creation of the Committee on 
Book Buying under the ALA and changes in book-purchasing decisions.
The ALA introduced the Committee on Relations of Libraries with the 
Booktrade during its annual meeting in Waukesha, Wisconsin, in 1901, and 
selected W. T. Peoples as the chairman of the committee.42 The major goals of 
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this committee were “not only to guard the purchasing interests of the various 
members composing our Association, but also to endeavor to promote ami-
cable and harmonious relations with [the American Publishers’] Association 
as the representative of the book trade.” The committee took great efforts to 
communicate with the APA in order to obtain better terms from publish-
ers.43 However, due to the ALA’s own governance law, the committee was not 
allowed to provide libraries with instructions on actions to take, and thus the 
ALA discharged this committee during its annual meeting in 1903. Meanwhile, 
the ALA appointed a new committee under the same name, with the main 
purpose of providing advice to librarians throughout the country regarding 
“any measures that may seem feasible, including variations in methods of pur-
chase, for the avoidance or mitigation of the hardships experienced through 
the net-price system.”44
In service of its mission, the new committee issued bulletins to provide 
libraries with information and advice on measures to take to reduce the neg-
ative impact of the net price system. The committee compiled a list of about 
1,000 libraries that might not be able to get access to those journals and mailed 
the bulletins to them on postal cards. In 1905 the committee changed its name 
to the Committee on Bookbuying, to indicate that library “relations with the 
booktrade are to be limited to the peaceful avenues of commerce, excluding 
controversy, [and] retaliation.”45
Some librarians began to discuss other measures to mitigate the finan-
cial hardships in book purchasing.46 Some librarians noted the efforts made 
by English librarians to reduce the hardships under the net price system in 
Britain.47 Later, these measures appeared in the bulletins of the Committee on 
Bookbuying in a more systematic and detailed way, and included actions such 
as the following: (1) purchasing fewer net books; (2) purchasing old books; 
(3) purchasing second-hand books; (4) importing books; (5) purchasing from 
the remainder list to obtain books that just passed their protection year at low 
prices; and (6) purchasing from auction catalogs to obtain lower prices.48
The committee, as well as several other librarians, recommended purchas-
ing fewer net books because these books were expensive, and their prices 
would be greatly reduced after their one-year protection period. Therefore, 
libraries could save money either by purchasing non–net books, or by delaying 
their purchase of net books by a year or longer. Further, librarians found the 
remainder list or auction catalog to be excellent sources for obtaining these 
previous net books in new condition. For net books that had a British edition, 
in many cases British editions were cheaper than American ones. With their 
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privilege of free importation, libraries could save money by importing books, 
even if they had to pay transportation fees.49
Changes in Librarian Ideas of Good Books and Fair Prices
After complaining about the net price system in the first several years of its 
existence, some librarians noticed that it could also be beneficial to them, 
largely because the system had taught them to be more careful buyers and 
negotiators.50 After the shift in purchasing channels began, so did a shift in 
libraries’ book selection and buying philosophy.
One of the most significant changes brought by the net price system was 
that libraries became less dependent on new books to build their collections. 
Before the net price system, and even during its early stages, many libraries 
relied heavily on new books for collection development. A Library Journal 
editorial contended that “newly published books are the chief consumption of 
most libraries,” and another librarian made a similar claim about the propor-
tion of net books in library purchases.51
In the net price system's early stage, some librarians suggested limiting or 
even boycotting the purchase of net books to protest against the exorbitant 
prices for library books, with the hope that publishers might accept requests 
for either a lower net price or a larger discount.52 After the APA declined 
libraries’ requests for modifying the net price system, librarians gradually real-
ized that many net books were not necessary for library collections. Novelty, 
and the higher prices that came with it, was increasingly questioned as a prin-
ciple for purchasing. The ALA Bookbuying Committee issued a bulletin titled 
“Reading Ripe Books,” claiming that “the reading of new books because they 
are new, to the neglect of good books because they are old” was an “evil.”53 
Specifically, the bulletin argued that many people tended to read the latest 
books regardless of their quality, which was harmful to all the stakeholders 
in the book trade: readers, booksellers, publishers, and authors. As “the only 
counteracting force” against this “evil,” the bulletin argued, libraries should 
not devote most of their money to “satisfying the immediate desires of the 
public for literature so perishable that it has to be handled as rapidly as milk 
and eggs,” because most of these new books would just become unwanted sev-
eral months later. The bulletin advised that libraries use the net price system to 
their benefit and begin to purchase as few net books as possible, which would 
be “a powerful influence against the trashy and ephemeral,” and thus would be 
“for the benefit of good literature.” Several librarians shared the opinion of this 
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bulletin: many net books were in the category of trivial books, and libraries 
should therefore avoid them.54
An increase in the valuation of other types of books, particularly old books, 
accompanied the devaluation of new books. As Hopkins stated, “Many of [the 
older books] are better than the books that will come out under the net-price 
system.” “Reading Ripe Books” also referred to some librarians’ endeavors to 
promote old books in libraries and claimed that these efforts have “direct[ed] 
the public to the best in literature regardless of its age.”55
Another noticeable change in the way libraries approached books was the 
shift toward understanding the total cost of a book in relation to its durability 
and projected usage. When the net price system was first introduced, librar-
ians primarily focused on price when selecting materials. One librarian, Mr. 
Elmendorf, stated, “I buy books at the lowest possible cash price,” and several 
other librarians made similar statements about the importance of the price 
factor in their book-selection practices.56
When the net price system decreased the purchasing power of libraries, 
it also taught librarians to consider a broader range of criteria, collectively 
referred to as the total cost of a book, in deciding whether a book price was 
acceptable or not. As one bulletin stated, “The total cost of a book is repre-
sented by first cost plus cost of preserving and caring for it during its life.” 
Considering the cost of mending, rebinding, or replacing books, a loosely 
bound book with a lower price could cost more than a stoutly bound book 
with a higher price, since the former would be more likely to wear out. 
Further, the bulletin suggested that libraries should take the projected usage of 
a book into consideration when calculating its total cost; it would probably be 
unnecessary to purchase a book with a low circulation rate in strong binding. 
In response, publishers started to provide different editions of books, pricing 
editions differently based on material quality and projected long-term value, 
among other factors.57
What Cultural Commodities Tell Us about the Net Price System
The study of the net price system in the early twentieth century demonstrates 
publisher strategies to protect their profits in the library book market through 
the control of price, which links to books’ characteristics as being fragile as a 
cultural commodity, and this nature of the cultural commodity drives publish-
ers to influence the structure of the book marketplace in the early  twentieth 
century, and today.
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The “fragility” of cultural commodities refers to two different of meanings: 
First, cultural commodities are fragile because of their uncertain use-value. 
Some scholars argue that the demand and thus the marketplace for cultural 
commodities is unpredictable, since cultural commodities are “not rooted in 
biological necessity” due to their nature as “non-utilitarian objects.”58 Second, 
cultural commodities are fragile because the initial purchase allows a consumer 
to enjoy a repeated (and sometimes pirated) experience. Since the consumption 
of cultural commodities does not destroy these products, a consumer will not 
buy an identical copy multiple times in most cases. Further, most of the pur-
chased cultural commodity will live on before its physical decay, which makes 
it hard for producers to “establish the scarcity on which price is based.”59
The producers of cultural commodities, including book publishers, have 
adopted different strategies to mitigate the uncertain demand of their products. 
The most common way is to offer a repertoire of products as a risk-spreading 
strategy to improve producers’ chance to develop a highly demanded prod-
uct.60 Therefore, publishers tend to provide a wide range of books, hoping 
that at least one of them will become popular enough to cover the cost for pro-
ducing all these titles. Further, publishers will not reduce the chance to expose 
other books in the repertoire even when they already have one or more pop-
ular titles, because it is still possible that one of the rest books might become 
popular later.
The net price system represents one of the publishing industry’s efforts to 
protect the repertoire of products and to finally mitigate the fragility of books 
as a cultural commodity. Specifically, the primary reason for the APA to estab-
lish the net price system was to protect the interests of booksellers during the 
price competition with other types of book distributors, because bookstores 
were the major distributors of larger repertoires of publishers’ books, includ-
ing both popular books and other types of books. In other words, bookstores 
were the primary and reliable way for publishers to increase the exposure of a 
complete list of their books; while the alternative distributors, like dry goods 
stores or department stores, usually only sold one or two of a publisher’s most 
popular books, rather than the whole list of publishers’ books. Therefore, pub-
lishers introduced the net price system to prevent those alternative channels 
from selling the popular books at lower prices. Without a price advantage, 
these alternative distribution channels became less attractive to potential con-
sumers of books. It helped the bookstore establish and enhance its role as the 
main distributors in the book market, which also secured a reliable outlet for 
publishers to expose all their books to potential customers.
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E-books, Fragility, and Control
We believe that historical study of the net price system is important for contem-
porary librarians negotiating e-book licenses because in both markets publishers 
and distributors have introduced artificial means to minimize the effects of the 
market “fragility” of books. Regardless of the book format, the fragility of books 
has been and continues to be managed through controls like net price agree-
ments or digital rights management.61 Therefore, we historicize the net price 
system with an eye not only toward those interested in library history or book 
history, but also toward those who are negotiating sales and contracts on behalf 
of readers and publics more interested in the accessibility of books in libraries 
than with the bottom lines of powerful publishers and distributors.
Understanding how fragility was mitigated through price control in the 
past helps us better understand how e-book publishers take advantage of dig-
ital formats to reduce fragility and gain market advantages today. We have 
observed from the net price system that the major strategy for publishers in 
the past to reduce the fragility of their books was to minimize the uncertain 
demand of their books through the protection of booksellers as their major 
distributors. Today, publishers adopt similar strategies to increase the expo-
sure of their e-books, like the recommendation system built on users’ read-
ing history, or making their e-books available to multiple platforms. Another 
strategy, brought out by digital technologies, for contemporary publishers to 
reduce the fragility of their e-books is to limit access to their e-books for the 
purpose of creating scarcity. Ted Striphas notes that the digital technologies 
allow publishers and distributors to retain some control of e-books after pur-
chase in a “society of controlled consumption.”62 In the library book market 
specifically, digital technologies, particularly the digital rights management 
(DRM), and licensing make library e-books less fragile by limiting repeated 
consumption of those e-books. Specifically, DRM, like the loan cap and the 
restriction of interlibrary loans, controls and limits libraries and their patrons’ 
behaviors on legitimately purchased e-books to create artificial scarcity; while 
licensing, especially the subscription without perpetual access, increases the 
number of times libraries must pay for licenses of e-books in order to enjoy 
repeated uses and support ongoing circulation of the e-book.
Mapping Power and Pricing
Another special characteristic of cultural commodities is the unpredictabil-
ity of an individual cultural commodity’s price due to the uncertainty of 
demand. Historically and in the present, we see evidence that it is challenging 
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for publishers and distributors to price library books, and it is also difficult 
for libraries to determine whether a certain book price is appropriate or not. 
One possible way to approach the pricing of library books is to understand 
the unstable power relations among the major stakeholders: publishers, dis-
tributors, and libraries. Brett Christophers argues that power is “the critical 
factor” in determining the price of cultural commodities, and power “shapes 
the scope, intensity and outcome of all negotiations [between buyers and 
sellers].”63 A comparison of the net pricing debate to contemporary e-book 
debates can help librarians recognize and predict the workings of power rela-
tions today by mapping strategic patterns among the major stakeholders over 
time. In what follows, then, we map the strategies adopted by publishers, 
distributors, and librarians in negotiating book prices. Based on how these 
stakeholders acted in battles over the net price system, we then examine how 
these strategies, more generally, continue to shape negotiations in the e-book 
market today.
The first strategy enacted by publishers to influence library book pricing 
has been to establish professional associations. By forming such an organization, 
publishers have been able to introduce and regulate industry-level action in 
order to maximize the interests of publishers as a whole. For instance, in the 
net price age, publishers gained their power through a united professional 
association, the APA. The majority of publishers were members of the APA, 
which meant they all followed the net price system; thus, libraries did not 
have much of a choice other than to accept the rules made by the APA. A 
challenge publishers have historically encountered, and might still encounter, 
when forming such professional associations is how to balance the power of 
the association in order to avoid violation of antitrust laws.
Publishers also commonly emphasize the negative effect of library lending on 
book sales. In both periods, publishers have claimed that library lending hin-
ders their sale of books because readers will not be willing to purchase personal 
copies once they can check out the books from libraries for free. Publishers 
emphasize the negative effect of library lending on book sales, so they can 
justify library pricing strategies as compensation for losses experienced in the 
retail market due to library lending. Solid data supporting publishers’ claims 
of the negative effect of library lending is difficult to find, however.
In turn, the most important strategy libraries adopt to gain power has been 
to rely on the leading role of the AL A . As a not-for-profit organization working 
for the library community, the ALA has been an advocate for library inter-
ests. During the net price period, the ALA Bookbuying Committee provided 
continuous guidance for libraries in finding alternatives to net books to build 
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their collections; this directly reduced the control of the net price system over 
libraries. In the e-book era, the ALA published Ebook Business Model to pro-
vide public libraries with guidelines on e-book licensing terms, including but 
not limited to e-book pricing issues, so that libraries were able to “negotiate 
aggressively for the most favorable and flexible terms possible.”64
A second strategy libraries use is collective protest. In adopting this strategy, 
some individual libraries or library associations use collective efforts to fight 
against publishers’ pricing decisions. Although such protests usually cannot 
generate immediate change in the pricing of library books, they raise publish-
ers’ and even a broader public’s awareness of libraries’ concerns or attitudes 
toward pricing issues. Examples of this strategy include the state library asso-
ciations’ request to modify the net price system in 1902 and, more recently, 
some libraries’ boycotts against HarperCollins’ twenty-six-loan cap in 2011.
The third effort libraries take is to stress the importance of the library market. 
This strategy allows libraries to gain a certain power over publishers by claim-
ing their critical role for publishers’ business. By citing data either from library 
communities or from third parties, like the Pew survey on e-book usage, 
libraries attempt to prove the benefits of library lending to retail book markets 
in order to weaken publishers’ justification of their library pricing strategies.65
Finally, libraries use consortia purchasing. When multiple libraries work 
together to form a purchasing consortium, the consortium often builds a 
greater power than the individual members could; thus the consortium is able 
to negotiate lower prices for its members. Such purchasing consortia are com-
mon in the current e-book age, and according to the LJ  e-book usage survey, 
about 64 percent of public libraries in the United States are members of a 
consortium for e-book purchasing.66
Distributors also try to maximize their strategic power in the market. Many 
libraries rely heavily on distributors like bookstores and e-book aggregators to 
build their collections. Therefore, the power relations between libraries and 
distributors directly affect the pricing of library books. One strategy distribu-
tors use to affect library book pricing is industry-level regulations. Distributors 
use this strategy to eliminate what would otherwise be chaotic competition 
among themselves. By developing industry-level regulations, distributors are 
able to coordinate within the profession to control library book prices. One 
example of this strategy was the ABA’s involvement in the net price system, 
where many booksellers formed a professional organization, the ABA, and 
joined the APA in establishing the net price system in order to regulate the 
maximum library discount.
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In turn, libraries sometimes push back against distributors. Libraries gain 
more power in their relationships with distributors by exploring alternative 
acquisition channels. By expanding their acquisition channels, libraries are 
able to reduce their reliance on mainstream distributors, and therefore obtain 
leverage in the negotiation of pricing. For instance, libraries purchased books 
from auctions or imported books from foreign publishers in the net price age, 
and libraries nowadays purchase e-books from some smaller distributors, such 
as “Freading” or “24symbols.” A more radical example is that of the Douglas 
County Libraries in Colorado, where libraries play the role of distributors to 
collaborate with multiple publishers to provide e-books to their patrons.67
Distributors and publishers also negotiate among themselves through the 
shifts between two models: wholesale and agency. Under the wholesale model, 
publishers sell books to distributors at wholesale prices, and distributors are 
able to set book prices by themselves; under the agency model, publishers 
directly set the retail prices, while distributors receive a fixed commission for 
the books they sell.68 The shifts between the two models reflect the changing 
power relations between publishers and distributors, and it is not difficult to 
find examples of these shifts throughout the history of the publishing industry.
In the early twentieth century, the net price system allowed the publishing 
industry to transfer from the wholesale model to the agency model, in which 
publishers were able to directly set the prices for retails and libraries in order 
to eliminate the chaotic competition among distributors. By switching to the 
net price system, distributors sold books at the prices set by publishers, which 
then eliminated the price competition; the tradeoff for distributors to accept-
ing the agency model here was that they lost control over the book prices. In 
the e-book age, two recent cases demonstrate the battles between publishers 
and distributors. The first one is the lawsuit United States v. Apple Inc., et al., 
and the second one is the dispute between Amazon and Hachette in 2014.69 In 
both e-book cases, the publishers tried to move from the wholesale model to 
the agency model due to their discontent with Amazon’s $9.99 pricing strategy. 
It is interesting to note that the two cases had disparate results: in the first case, 
the court concluded that Apple and these publishers violated the Sherman 
Act and, consequently, publishers’ attempts to raise their e-book prices failed; 
in the second case, Hachette eventually was able to set its e-book prices 
through Amazon, and further, Amazon, Simon and Schuster, Macmillan, and 
HarperCollins recently signed similar agreements, which allow the publishers 
to set their Amazon e-book prices. The different resolutions from the two cases 
demonstrate the unstable power relations between publishers and Amazon.
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While these disputes primarily affect retail book prices, the power relations 
between publishers and distributors ripple out to library book prices. First, 
the shifting power determines libraries’ strategies during the negotiation of 
book prices. In publisher-distributor relations, the party that has more power 
will determine the pricing model for library books, and therefore libraries 
should focus on the negotiations with this party. Second, the battle between 
publishers and distributors influences library perceptions of appropriate book 
pricing. For instance, nowadays many libraries use the Amazon retail prices to 
compare with library prices and claim that library e-books are overpriced.70
Conclusion
Publishers and librarians have debated book pricing over time and will con-
tinue to do so in the future. On the one hand, publishers rely on strategies 
to reduce the fragility of their books/e-books and thus to protect the market 
values of those books/e-books: in the early twentieth century, they protected 
booksellers through controlled prices of net books, which allowed them to 
ensure the exposure of their complete list of books, and then to reduce the 
fragility brought by the uncertain demands of books; while in the contem-
porary e-book market, publishers adopt strategies such as DRM or licensing 
to limit the repeated use of library books, which then minimizes the fragility 
through establishing scarcity of the e-books. On the other hand, the inherent 
connection between power and price remains the same from past to present: 
stakeholders in the library book market have always tried to gain more power 
over other parties to influence book/e-book prices, and librarians should look 
to the past to model and predict the actions of others in the network of power 
and negotiation that we have described.
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